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Abstract
In a high-crime environment with many high-income citizens, private security companies 
which oﬀ  er protection against crime can ﬂ  ourish. In this article crime is modelled as a 
game where richer victims yield a higher return on crime, but with decreasing returns 
to crime as more criminals choose crime to supplement their income. Private security 
providers oﬀ  er protection against crime and face Cournot competition. The model 
allows for the analysis of market clearing prices for eﬀ  ort against crime. Among the 
implications of the model are that rising inequality will lead to more expenditure on 
protection against crime, and that the upper income classes are suﬀ  ering from the same 
or lower crime density than the middle income class. Taking into account the response 
of criminals and victims, rising inequality can actually lead to less crime if either (i) the 
legal income opportunity of the marginal criminal increases or (ii) marginal utility from 
income decreases and richer individuals spend a higher proportion of their income 
on protection (i.e. protection is a superior good). Often the middle class suﬀ  ers from 
higher crime densities as inequality increases, as the increased spending on protection 
by the upper class (i) shifts crime to the middle class and (ii) increases market prices 
for protection, leaving the middle class with less aﬀ  ordable protection against crime. 
Emigration of the middle class can then further increase inequality. This highlights the 
importance of taking into account the response of individuals against crime and shows 
that the link between inequality and crime is a complex one.
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This article focuses on property crime directed against private individuals
or households, the response of victims to crime, the effect of the income
distribution on the crime level, the distribution of crime among households,
and the distribution and effect of private effort against crime.
While private demand and supply for protection against crime is not
uncommon, in many countries this protection is mostly of a passive nature,
whereas the active fight against crime is the job of the public police. However,
in a high-crime environment with an under-supplied police force, high in-
equality, and many high-income citizens, private security companies which
offer the service of a regular police to paying customers can flourish. As of
2009, more than 375,000 private security officers are active in South Africa,1
working for 6,392 private security providers.2 These private security officers
and the armed response vehicles of private security companies outnumber
the members of the public South African Police Service (SAPS) and police
vehicles by 3:1 (Goodenough 2007). Of the private security companies, 1,181
are registered as “active armed response businesses” as of 2007. According to
surveys, South Africans trust the private security industry far more than they
trust the SAPS (Prinsloo and Marais 2006).
The pioneering work in the economic analysis of crime is due to Becker
(1968). He treats criminals as rational individuals who decide to become
criminal solely based on expected utility. He uses a social welfare function to
derive optimal policies that minimize the cost of crime to society. A rather
short section of his paper is devoted to private expenditures against crime,
and the supply side of protection is not explicitly modelled. While Becker’s
work inspired many empirical tests of its implications and further theoretical
discussions about crime (e.g. Ehrlich 1973, Ehrlich 1975, Block and Heineke
1975, Witte 1980, Ehrlich 1996, Corman and Mocan 2000, Di Tella and Schar-
grodsky 2004), the analysis of private demand and supply for protection and
1The number excludes guards employed in-house.
2Data according to the Annual Reports 2006/2007 and 2008/2009 of the South African
Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority (PSIRA).
4its effects has received less attention. Becker and Stigler (1974), Landes and
Posner (1975), and Polinsky (1980) discuss the possibilities of private law en-
forcement when enforcers receive a fraction of the fine paid by the criminals;
see also Friedman (1984). Effects of private precautions against crime have
been considered by Clotfelter (1978), Shavell (1991), Ben-Shahar and Harel
(1995), and Helsley and Strange (1999).
One argument for a public tax-financed police force is that protection
against crime is a human right, and that therefore the supply of security for
citizens,independentoftheirincome,isaprimetaskforanystate. Aneffective
executive is also a cornerstone of any functioning state. Besides arguments
from ethics and jurisprudence, supplying protection might exhibit increasing
returns to scale, leading to a natural monopoly; and one might argue that,
given the delicate nature of the business, it is best left to the state. However, as
in the case of South Africa, there is evidence that suggests that the security
industry can be quite competitive.
Economic theory predicts that higher inequality can lead to more crime,
based on opportunity costs and incentives. We might also expect exposure to
property crime to be relatively higher among richer households than among
poorer households because richer individuals are more attractive targets. The
empirical evidence for these predictions is somewhat mixed: For example,
Witt et al. (1999) find that inequality increases crime; Kelly (2000) finds that
inequality has no effect on property crime, but poverty has a positive effect;
Choe (2008) finds a strong and robust effect of relative income inequality on
burglary; Neumayer (2005) does not find a strong effect of income inequality
ontheft. DiTellaetal.(2002)findthatforhomerobberiesvictimsofincreased
c r i m el e v e l si nA r g e n t i n ah a v em o s t l yb e e np o o r ,w h e r e a sb o t hr i c ha n dp o o r
have suffered similar increases in victimization for street robberies; Witt et al.
(1999) find that availability of “thievable property” increases crime; Bernasco
andNieuwbeerta(2005)findthattheeffectofneighbourhoodaffluenceasmea-
sured by real estate value has no significant effect on crime and that burglars
do not show an apparent preference for wealthy neighbourhoods; Demom-
bynes and Berk (2005) show that burglary rates in South Africa are higher in
5wealthier police jurisdictions and that burglars travel to neighborhoods with
higher expected returns; Evans (1989: 93–94) summarizes evidence which
suggests that burglars even prefer low-status neighbourhoods.
One possible reason for these mixed results is that (potential) victims
of crime respond to crime rates by appropriate precautions against crime,
partly to directly protect their property, partly to deter crime in the first
place and perhaps to shift crime to other, less protected, individuals. For
example, Di Tella et al. (2002) present evidence that rich households are
better able to protect their homes through private security; Collett-Schmitt
(2007) finds that burglar alarms have a significant and negative effect on
burglary rates. Gonzalez-Navarro (2008) finds that while the introduction
of the vehicle tracking technology Lojack for certain publicly know car types
in some Mexican states reduced theft for Lojack cars by 55%, most of this
reduction in theft was offset by increased theft in neighbouring states.
Theideathatindividualprecautionscanshiftcrimefromthosewhoinvest
in private security to those who do not is not new to the theoretical literature
(e.g. Clotfelter 1978, Shavell 1991). The case of South Africa suggests that this
effectcanbereal, andcanincreasesocialinequalityinaheterogeneoussociety.
Goodenough (2007) quotes the manager of the South African municipality of
eThekwini:
Distances, both social and physical, then divide people even
further and the more resourced group decides to spend more
money on privatized security. The poor in turn become more
reliant on a security force whose members are often paid less
than that of the private sector.
Similarly, Irish (1999) notes that in South Africa
[t]heexpansionofprivatesecurityinvolvement,suchaspatrolling
t h en e i g h b o u r h o o d so ft h o s ew h oc a na ff o r di t ,h a st h ee ff e c t
of creating ‘enclaves’. There may be a reduction in crime in an
enclave, but this does not lead to an overall reduction in crime.
6ThemodelofBarenboimandCampante(2008)suggeststhatthe(possible)
causality between inequality and crime can also be inverted; in fact they show
empirically that partly due to emigration crime can increase inequality.
I nthisa rtic le ,crim eism ode lledasaga m ewi tham eas ur es paceo fp la y er s
with different legal income. Richer victims yield a higher return on crime,
but the return to crime directed against a particular income type decreases
as more criminals target that income type. Private security providers offer
protection against crime and face Cournot competition. The model allows
for the analysis of market clearing prices for effort against crime. Some of
the implications of the model are that rising inequality will lead to more
expenditureonprotectionagainstcrime,andthattheupperincomeclassesare
suffering from the same or lower crime density than the middle income class.
Taking into account the response of criminals and victims, rising inequality
can actually lead to less crime if either (i) the legal income opportunity of the
marginalcriminalincreasesor(ii)marginalutilityfromincomedecreasesand
richer individuals spend a higher proportion of their income on protection
(i.e. protection is a superior good). Often the middle class suffers from
higher crime densities as inequality increases, as the increased spending on
protection by the upper class (i) shifts crime to the middle class and (ii)
increases market prices for protection, leaving the middle class with less
affordable protection against crime. Emigration of the middle class can then
further increase inequality. This highlights the importance of taking into
account the response of individuals against crime and shows that the link
b e t w e e ni n e q u a l i t ya n dc r i m ei sac o m p l e xo n e .
The rest of the paper is organized as follow. Section 2 introduces the basic
s e t u po fa ne c o n o m yw i t ham e a s u r es p a c eo fi n d i v i d u a l sa n dt h eu t i l i t yf u n c -
tions characterizing them. It is shown that an equilibrium crime distribution
exists, that poor individuals supplement their income with crime, while rich
individuals do not, that inequality tends to increase crime but this is not a ne-
cessity, that higher income of high income types can decrease the harm from
crime suffered by poor and intermediate income types and vice versa. Section
3 introduces private security companies which supply the economy with effort
7against crime. They face Cournot-competition; the model allows in principle
to analyse market clearing prices for security. It shows that an equilibrium
exists; thatricherindividualswilldemandmoreeffortthanpoorerindividuals;
that individuals for whom it is optimal not to demand effort never benefit and
often suffer from the private provision of security; that effort against crime is
a superior good and an increase in income of rich individuals will increase
the market price for effort, leaving poor and intermediate income types worse
off than before.
2 the basic setup
2.1 Preliminaries
We consider a non-atomic economy with a population that consists of a
continuum of individuals (or players), given by the unit interval Q =[ 0,1]
endowed with Lebesgue measure μ. Individuals have a certain legal income
y ∈ R+,wh i c hw ewillal sor e f e rt oa sth eincome type ofan individual. Income
is distributed according to a (cumulative) distribution function F ∶ R+ →[ 0,1],
i.e F(y) represents the proportion of individuals with income less than or
equal to y.Af u n c t i o nY ∶ Q → R+ is referred to as the income distribution,
with Yq = F−1(q)=infy{y ∶ F(y)≥q}, i.e. Yq gives the income of the
individual at q ∈ Q. We will also refer to a q ∈ Q as the income type, meaning
income Yq, when the meaning is clear. Note that the density at every q is unity.
Let D denote the set of all income distributions.
I n d i v i d u a l sh a v eastrategy set A = Q ∪{−1}.As t r a t e g ya ∈ Q is inter-
preted as becoming a criminal and stealing from individuals of income type
a to supplement the legal income. The strategy a =− 1 is interpreted as not
becoming a criminal. For a clearer exposition, we will denote AC = Q.L e tM
be the set of Borel probability measures on A.
Each individual is characterized by a utility function U ∶ A×M → R;
let U be the set of all utility functions. Given the strategy aq ∈ Achosen by
the individual q and the strategy distribution ν of all individuals, Uq(aq,ν)
8represents the utility of that individual. A game of crime is then characterized
by a Borel measure μ on U.
Let χbeaBorelmeasureonU×A,andlet χU and χAdenotethemarginals
of χ onUand A,respectively. Weinterpret χA(a)=∫q∈Q χ(Uq,a)dq, a ∈ AC,
as the crime density at income type a,a n dc∗ = 1− χA(−1) as the crime rate.
2.2 The Utility Functions
Before we specify the utility functions of the individuals, we adopt a simplify-
ing informal assumption to keep the model tractable:
Assumption 1. Only legal income Yq can be stolen.
Remark 1. Technically, we need Assumption 1 to avoid recursive definitions.
Without the assumption, the strategy sets would have to be expanded to allow to
choose not only to steal from individuals of income type q, but also to choose to
steal from individuals of income type q who choose to steal from individuals of
income type q′ w h oc h o o s et os t e a lf r o mi n d i v i d u a l so fi n c o m et y p eq ′′ etc.
The income from stealing will be referred to as the crime payoff or simply
payoff to avoid confusion with the (legal) income. The payoff from stealing
of individuals of income type q depends on their income Yq and the crime
densityatq. Thispayoffcanberepresentedbyacontinuousintegrablefunction
S ∶ Q ×R+ → R+. We use the shorthand notation Sa f o rt h ep a y o ffo fs t r a t e gy
a ∈ AC whenever the meaning is clear.
Individuals of type q will experience disutility from criminal activity di-
rected against them, i.e. from individuals who choose strategy a = q.Th i s
disutility depends on the crime density at q and can be represented by a con-
tinuous function H ∶ Q → R+. We use the shorthand notation Hq whenever
t h em e a n i n gi sc l e a r .
Weassumethatindividualswhochooseastrategy a ∈ AC areapprehended
and arrested with a fixed probability p ∈( 0,1). If arrested, they lose their legal
income and payoff from crime and suffer from a punishment represented by
ψ ∈ R+.
9We can now specify the utility for each type and each strategy. Let u ∶
Q ×R → R+ be a continuous increasing function representing utility from
legal income Yq and criminal payoff, strictly increasing in Yq and Sa.W eu s e





u(Yq,0)−H(χA[q]) if a =− 1,
(1− p)u(Yq,S[Ya, χA(a)])− pψ−H(χA[q]) if a ∈ AC.
(1)
Thus, H represents disutility from crime in terms of units of utility from
income and payoff.
By definition the density at every individual q ∈ Q equals unity, thus
we have χU(Uq)=∫a∈A χ(Uq,a)=1 for all Uq ∈ U and χA(a)=
∫U∈U χ(U,a)dU = ∫q∈Q χ(Uq,a)dq.
Remark 2. The disutility or harm H e x p e r i e n c e db yi n d i v i d u a l sd u et oc r i m e
does not depend on the success of their own criminal activity. We could consider
at w o - s t a g em o d e li nw h i c hi n d i v i d u a l se a r nl e g a li n c o m ea n dc r i m i n a lp a y o ff
and experience disutility from crime in the first stage. In the beginning of the
s e c o n ds t a g e ,i ti sd e t e r m i n e dw h e t h e ro rn o tac r i m i n a li sa r r e s t e d ,a n do n l y
individuals who are not arrested get to enjoy their utility u. The disutility H
shouldbeinterpretedasconsistingofpsychologicalandcollateraldamagecaused
by victimization. For different specifications of U, individuals’ choice of strategy
could be influenced by the harm caused due to crime, i.e. individuals could
prefer to choose a ∈ AC simply to escape the disutility H. Also note that, ceteris
paribus, an increase in the crime density at q does not mean that more is stolen
from that income type. Thus, we think of Yq as “income net of theft”.
Let M denote a set M =[ m,1]⊆Q, m ∈[ 0,1) such that Ym < Yq for all
q ∈( m,1], and let ¯ M = Q/M, AM = M,a n dA ¯ M = ¯ M.
Assumption 2. Strategy a ∈ A ¯ M yields a payoff of zero: Sa = 0 for all a ∈ A ¯ M.
Note that Assumption 2 is not a simplification of the model; in particular,
¯ M =∅is possible.
10So far, we have specified the primitives of the model in quite general
terms, but we will impose several assumptions. The first two assumptions
concern the crime payoff: Payoff is increasing and convex in the income of
the target victim type, and decreasing and convex in the crime density at the
target victim type; furthermore, every income in AM yields enough payoff to
“support” a positive measure of criminals targeting that type.
Assumption 3. For all a ∈ AM and Ya > 0, Sa satisfies the following condi-
tions: ∂Sa/∂Ya > 0, ∂2Sa/∂Y2
a ≥ 0, ∂Sa/∂χA(a)<0, ∂2Sa/∂χA(a)2 ≥ 0 with
limχA(a)→∞ Sa = 0.
Assumption 4. For every δ > 0 and a,a′ ∈ AM,t h e r ee x i s t sa nε ∈( 0,δ),s u c h
that S(Ya,ε)>S(Ya′,δ) and S(Ya,ε)>0.
We also adopt an assumption which guarantees that a set of individuals of
measure greater than zero choose a ∈ AC in equilibrium, and that the crime
density is strictly positive on M.
Assumption 5. There exists an ε > 0 and a q ∈( 0,1) such that for all a ∈ AM,
(1− p)u(Yq,S[Ya,ε])− pψ> u(Yq,0).
The next assumption concerns the disutility from crime.
Assumption6. Ifthesetofindividualswho choosestrategy a ∈ AC hasmeasure
zero (i.e., χA(a)=0), individuals of income type a experiences no disutility:
H(a)=0.F o ra l la ∈ AC, Ha is a continuous and convave function, strictly
increasing in χA(a):∂ H a/∂χA(a)>0,∂ 2Ha/∂χA(a)2 ≥ 0.
Thefunctionu isaquitegeneralformforutilityderivedfromlegalincome
and criminal payoff. We will now adopt more assumptions about its form
which are standard in economics.
Assumption 7. We have ∂u(y,S)/∂y> 0, ∂2u(y,S)/∂y2 ≤ 0, ∂u(y,S)/∂S >
0,∂ 2u(y,S)/∂S2 ≤ 0,∂ 2u(y,S)/∂y∂S ≤ 0,∂ 2u(y,S)/∂S∂y ≤ 0.
11We distinguish between assumptions and conditions. If a condition is
assumed to hold, it will be explicitly noted.
Condition 1. The function S satisfies S(Ya, χA[a]) = R(Ya)/χA(a),w h e r e
R ∶ R+ → R+ is strictly increasing in Ya.
Condition 2. The function R is an affine transformation of Y: R(y)=βy+γ,
with β ∈( 0,1) and γ ∈ R.
Remark 3. If γ > 0 we will necessarily have Sa > 0 for all a ∈ AC, i.e. m = 0
and M =∅ .
Condition 3. The function u only depends on the sum of legal income and
criminal payoff: u(y,S)=u(y +S,0).
Condition 4. The function H is an identity function, i.e. H(χa[q]) = χa(q).
2.3 The Income Distribution and Inequality
Given the definition of income distributions in Section 2.1, an income distri-
bution Y ∈ D is already the inverse of a cumulative distribution function. Let
¯ Y = ∫q∈Q Yq dq denote the average income of a distribution. Then the Lorenz
curve Lo ∶ D×Q →[ 0,1] i sg i v e nb y( G a s t w i r t h1 9 71 )
LoY(q)= ¯ Y−1 ∫
q
0
Y(˜ q)d ˜ q. (2)
The Lorenz curve can be used to define a partial ordering ≿Lo⊆ D×D,
called the Lorenz ordering:
Y1 ≿Lo Y2 if LoY1(q)≤LoY2(q) for all q ∈ Q. (3)
The Gini coefficient Gi ∶ D →[ 0,1] is given by
GiY = 1−2 ∫
1
0
LoY(˜ q)d ˜ q. (4)
122.4 Equilibrium
We can now define the equilibrium of a game.
Definition 1. For a game μ, a Borel measure χ on U× A with marginals χU
and χA is an equilibrium crime distribution if we have
(i) χU = μa n d
(ii) χ({(U,a)∶U(a, χA)≥U(a′, χA)∀a′ ∈ A}) =1 .
Remark 4. W h a tD e fi n i t i o n1s t a t e si st h a t( i )o n l yc r i m ed i s t r i b u t i o n sf o r
which the marginal distribution on U corresponds to the game are considered,
and that (ii) in equilibrium, every individual with any characteristics U who
chooses strategy a h a sn oi n c e n t i v et od e v i a t ea n dc h o o s ead i ff e r e n ts t r a t e g ya′,
given the marginal distribution on A, i.e. given the strategy distribution of all
individuals. Note that the equilibrium only considers the marginal distribution
on A, irrespective of the characteristics of those who choose any particular
strategy a. A more general definition would consider strategy profiles instead,
i.e. a function from Q to A,o rt oas i m p l e xo fm i x e ds t r a t e g i e s .A sR o u g h g a r d e n
and Tardos (2004) note,
[...] every action distribution is induced by some strategy profile.
When all players select pure strategies, passing from strategy pro-
files to action distributions can be viewed as aggregating players
according to their chosen strategies and ignoring their identities.
Theanalysisinthissectionconcernsonlyadistributionofstrategyprofile,because
by definition criminal payoff from a strategy a ∈ AC only depends on the density
of crime at the corresponding income type.
Proposition 1. An equilibrium crime distribution exists.
Remark 5. Proposition 1 is a special case of very general theorems about the ex-
istence of equilibria in non-atomic games (see Schmeidler 1973, Mas-Colell 1984,
Rath 1992). We therefore omit the proof, which would amount to a replication of,
for example, Mas-Colell’s proof. He shows (Mas-Colell 1984, Theorem 1) that for
a n yg a m eo ft h et y p eg i v e nb yD e fi n i t i o n1a ne q u i l i b r i u md i s t r i b u t i o ne x i s t s .
13Next, we will briefly summarize and proof some fairly obvious results.
Result 1. I fχi sa ne q u i l i b r i u mc r i m ed i s t r i b u t i o n ,t h e n
(i) χA(a)=0 for a ∈ A ¯ M,
(ii) χA(a)>0 for all a ∈ AM,
(iii) Sa = Sa′ for all a,a′ ∈ AM.
Proof Suppose that χ is an equilibrium crime distribution, and
(i) χA(a)>0 for some a ∈ A ¯ M.Th e nSa = 0 (by Assumption 2) and Sa′ > 0
for some a′ ∈ AM (by Assumption 3), thus Uq(a, χA)<UQ(a′, χA) for
all q ∈ Q (by Assumption 7), a contradiction;
(ii) χA(a)=0 for all a ∈ AM. Then there exists a q ∈( 0,1) such that
Uq(−1, χA)<Uq(a, χA) for all a ∈ AM (by Assumption 5), a contradic-
tion. Suppose that χA(a)=0 for some a ∈ AM and χA(a′)>0 for some
a′ ∈ AM.Th e nS(Yq,ε)>S(Yq, χA[a′]) for some ε > 0 (by Assumption
4), thus Uq(a, χA)>Uq(a′, χA) (by Assumption 7), a contradiction;
(iii) Sa > Sa′ for some a,a′ ∈ AM.Th e n Uq(a, χA)>Uq(a′, χA) for all
q ∈ Q (by Assumption 7). With χA(a′)>0 (by Result 1.[ii]), this is a
contradiction.
Result 2. In any equilibrium, χA(a)>χA(a′) for all Ya > Ya′,a ,a′ ∈ AM.
Proof Suppose χ is an equilibrium crime distribution and χA(a)≤χA(a′) for
some a > a′ and Ya > Ya′.Th e nS(Ya, χA[a]) > S(Ya′, χA[a]) (by Assump-
tion 3). By Result 1(iii), this is a contradiction.
The next result implies that there is “marginal criminal”, and that only the
poorest players become criminals.
Result 3. Suppose χ is an equilibrium crime distribution. Then
∫a∈AC
χ(Uq,a)da > 0 ⇒ ∫a∈AC
χ(Uq′,a)da > 0 for all q > q′,
∫a∈AC
χ(Uq,a)da = 0 ⇒ ∫a∈AC
χ(Uq′,a)da = 0 for all q < q′.
14Proof Recall the shorthand uq(a)=u(Yq,Sa).W eh a v e
Uq(a, χA)≥Uq(−1, χA)⇔( 1− p)uq(a)−pψ≥ uq(−1),
for all a ∈ AC; the equivalence also hold for strict inequality.
Lemma 1. The following statements are true in equilibrium:
∫a∈AC
χ(Uq,a)>0 ⇒( 1− p)uq(a)−uq(−1)≥pψ, (5a)
∫a∈AC
χ(Uq,a)=0 ⇒( 1− p)uq(a)−uq(−1)≤pψ. (5b)
Proof of Lemma 1 Suppose in equilibrium ∫a∈AC χ(Uq,a)>0 and (1 −
p)uq(a)−uq(−1)<pψfor some a ∈ AM;t h e nUq(−1, χA)>Uq(a, χA),a
contradiction. Suppose in equilibrium ∫a∈AC χ(Uq,a)=0 and (1− p)uq(a)−
uq(−1)<pψfor some a ∈ AM;t h e nUq(−1, χA)<Uq(a, χA), acontradiction.
Lemma 2. The following statements are true in equilibrium:
(1− p)uq(a)−uq(−1)≥pψ⇒( 1− p)uq′(a)−uq′(−1)>pψ
for all q > q′, (6a)
(1− p)uq(a)−uq(0)≤pψ⇒( 1− p)uq′(a)−uq′(−1)<pψ
for all q < q′. (6b)
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 It is sufficient to show that in equilibrium (1− p)uq(a)−
uq(−1)<( 1 − p)uq′(a)−uq′(−1) for all q > q′, which is equivalent to
(1 − p)[uq(a)−uq′(a)] < uq(−1)−uq′(−1).B e c a u s e p ∈( 0,1), it suffi-
cient that uq(a)−uq′(a)≤uq(−1)−uq′(−1). B yA s s u m p t i o n7w eh a v e
15∂u(Y,Sa)/∂Y ≤ ∂u(Y,0)/∂Y for Sa > 0.W eh a v eSa = Sa′ > 0forall a ∈ AM
(by Assumption 5 and Result 1), and with q < q′ we have Yq ≤ Yq′, which
proves Eq. (6b). The proof works analogously for Eq. (6a).
Lemmata 1 and 2 together prove Result 3.
Result 3 shows that there is a marginal criminal of some income type
q∗ ∈ Q; individuals of type q < q∗ with income Yq ≤ Yq∗ choose a ∈ AC and
individualsoftypeq > q∗ withincomeYq ≥ Yq∗ choose a =− 1. Thepreviously
defined crime rate c∗ = 1− χA(−1) is then equal to q∗. It can easily be seen
that Uq∗(a, χA)=Uq∗(−1, χA) if χA is an equilibrium crime distribution.
Informally, rising inequality is interpreted as “the rich get richer” and “the
poorgetpoorer”. Becauselowerincomeof“poor”individualswillincreasethe
differenceoftheutilitiesfromchoosing a ∈ AC and a =− 1, i.e. (1− p)uq(a)−
uq(−1), it seems natural that rising inequality increases the crime rate. This
is not necessarily the case, as we have to consider the legal income of the
marginal criminal. The next result illustrates this.
Result4. Fortwoincomedistributions Y1 and Y2, Y1 ≿Lo Y2 doesnotnecessarily
imply c∗
1 ≥ c∗
2.I ti sp o s s i b l et h a tY1 ≿Lo Y2 and c∗
1 < c∗
2.A sac o r o l l a r y ,ah i g h e r
Gini coefficient does not necessarily imply a higher crime rate.
Proof Consider Figure 1, where M = Q. The equilibrium crime level for the
old linear income distribution is indicated by c∗
1 . Now a shift of income incurs
such that Yq,2< Yq′,1for some q′ < q∗
1 and all q ≤ q′,a n dYq,2> Yq′,1for all
q > q′ and Yq′,2 = Yq′,1and unchanged average and total income. It can be
easily seen that Y1 ≿Lo Y2.
We have Yq∗
1 ,2 > Yq∗
1 ,1. Suppose for simplicity that S(Ya, χA[a]) =
βY a/χA(a) with β ∈( 0,1) ( i . e .C o n d i t i o n s1a n d2h o l dw i t hγ = 0)a n d
u(Yq,Sa)=Ya + Sa for all a ∈ AM = AC and all U ∈ UYi, i ∈{ 1,2}. There
exist β, p ∈( 0,1) and ψ ≥ 0 such that individual of income type q∗
1 is indeed
the marginal criminal for the income distribution Y1. Given the assumptions
on Sa and uq above, Sa,1 = Sa,2 if q∗
1 = q∗
2 because total income remains
unchanged. But for equilibrium crime distributions χA,1and χA,2we must
16have (1− p)u(Yq∗
i ,i,Sa,i)−pψ = u(Yq∗
i ,i,0) for all a ∈ AM and i ∈{ 1,2}.
























Figure 1: A less equal income distribution can lead to a lower crime rate, even if it Lorenz-
dominates.
Remark 6. Assuming S(Ya, χA[a]) = βY a/χA(a) and u(Yq,Sa)=Ya + Sa
is not necessary for Result 4, but it simplifies the proof. The intuition for the
result is simple: The income shift increases incentives for individuals of income
type q < q′ to choose crime, but all individuals of income type q < q′ are
already criminals, thus an increase in the crime rate cannot come from these
individuals. The increase in income of income type q∗
1 decreases the incentives
17of that income type to choose crime. Overall, the aggregated “stealable” income
r e m a i n sc o n s t a n t .Th er e s u l th i g h l i g h t st h ei m p o r t a n tf e a t u r et h a ti ti sc h a n g e s
in incentives of the marginal criminal which lead to changes in the crime rate.
2.5 Further Results
It light of Result 4, we would like to know under what circumstances a change
in the income distribution leads to a higher crime rate. In general, we can
distinguish two effects of changes of the income distribution: The effect on
the legal income of individuals at the margin between choosing crime and
no crime, and the effect on the payoff to crime. Because the crime rate is de-
termined by the q which solves (1− p)u(Yq,S)−pψ= u(Yq,0),a ni n c r e a s e
in Yq decreases the incentives to become criminal, and an increase in overall
income can (but not necessarily does) increase S, leading to an increase in
the incentives to become criminal. The latter effect is not necessarily positive
b e c a u s ei fi n c o m ei sp a r t l ys h i ft e df r o mi n d i v i d u a l sf r o mw h i c hi si tm o r e
efficienttosteal(withhigh ∂S/∂Y)toindividualsfromwhichisitlessefficient
(individuals in [0,m] or with low ∂S/∂Y), total “stealable income” actually
decreases. Thus, to avoid this problem and simplify the analyis, we will invoke
Conditions 1 and 2.
If Condition 1 holds, we define ¯ S as
¯ S =( q∗)−1 ∫˜ q∈Q
R(Y˜ q)d ˜ q;
note that ¯ S is independent of q.
Result 5. Suppose Condition 1 holds. Then in equilibrium ¯ S = Sa and χA(a)=






∫˜ a∈AC R(Y˜ a)d ˜ a
∫˜ a∈AC χA(˜ a)d ˜ a
18and q∗ = ∫˜ a∈AC χA(˜ a)d ˜ a = ∫˜ a∈AM χA(˜ a)d ˜ a, the result follows immediately.
The result states that in equilibrium, the crime distribution is determined
by R up to a multiplicative constant (given the overall crime level).
Result 6. Suppose Conditions 1 and 2 hold, with γ = 0 and m = 0.L e tY1 and





t h er e s p e c t i v ec r i m er a t e s ;Yq,1 and Yq,2 denote the incomes of type q for the two
distributions. Then in equilibrium, c∗
1 < c∗
2 if
(i) Yq,1 < Yq,2 for all q in some non-empty interval [q1,q2]⊂Q with q∗
1 ∉
[q1,q2] and Yq,1 = Yq,2 for all other q ∉[ q1,q2]; or, more generally, for a
s e to fn o ne m p t yi n t e r v a l s ,i f
Yq,1 < Yq,2 for all q ∈[ qi,qi+1]⊆Q for some i = 1,...,n,
with q∗
1 ∉[ qi,qi+1] for all i = 1,...,n
and Yq,1 = Yq,2 for all other q
(ii) Yq,1 > Yq,2 for all q in some non-empty interval [q∗
1 −ε1,q∗
1 +ε2]⊂Q for
















but for small enough ε1 and ε2,w eh a v e
(1− p)[u(Yq∗
1 ,1,Sa,1)−u(Yq∗
1 ,2,Sa,2)]− pψ> u(Yq∗
1 ,1,0)−u(Yq∗
1 ,2,0).
19Another interesting result is that if an increase in income of some indi-
viduals of measure greater than zero leads to increase in the crime rate, it
will increase the overall crime less than the crime density at these types, thus
reducing the crime density at other types.
Result 7. S u p p o s eC o n d i t i o n s1a n d2h o l d ,w i t hγ = 0 and m = 0. Suppose
for simplicity that Yq is strictly increasing in q.I ft h ei n c o m eo ft y p e si ns o m e
non-empty interval [q1,q2]⊂( q∗
1 ,1] increases, then c∗
2 > c∗
1 , χA,1(q)>χA,2(q)
for all q ∈[ q1,q2],a n dχA,1(q)<χA,2(q) for all q ∈ Q/[q1,q2],w h e r et h e
subscripts 1 and 2 denote the situations before and after the change of the income
distribution, respectively.
Proof The first part, c∗
2 > c∗
1 , is the same as Result 6(i). By Result 5 and with
Condition 2 and γ = 0,w eh a v eχA(a)=¯ S−1 βY a.Th u s ,i f¯ S increases and Ya
r e m a i n sc o n s t a n t( f o ra ∈ Q/[q1,q2]), then the result follows. We have
¯ S =( q∗)−1 β ∫˜ q∈Q
Y˜ q d ˜ q.
Suppose after the change in the income distribution, ¯ S remains constant or






We summarize the main results of this section in the following (informal)
proposition:
Proposition 2. Th e r ee x i s t sa ne q u i l i b r i u mc r i m ed i s t r i b u t i o nw h i c he q u a l i z e s
payoff of stealing from any income type for which stealing is profitable at all.
There exists a marginal criminal: All individuals with lower income supplement
their income with crime, while all individuals with higher income do not commit
crimes. Inequality tends to increase crime by (i) lowering the income of poorer
individuals and/or (ii) increasing “stealable income”; however, for (i) it mat-
ters whether the income of the marginal criminal is among the incomes which
d e c r e a s e ;i ti sp o s s i b l et ofi n de x a m p l e sf o rw h i c hh i g h e ri n e q u a l i t ya c t u a l l y
leads to less crime. Higher income of high income types can decrease the harm
20from crime suffered by poor and intermediate income types: Even though crime
increases, the crime targeted at high income types increases by more than overall
c r i m e ,t h u ss h i ft i n gs o m eo ft h ec r i m ef r o mp o o ra n di n t e r m e d i a t et y p e st ot h e
rich.
2.6 An Example
A short example based on the Singh-Maddala (1976) income distribution,




may be helpful to understand the basic model. We will only focus on a one-
parameter case, namely FS
α(y)=1−1/(1+xα). Using a result due to Wilfling
andKr¨ amer(1993), wehave FS
α(y)≿ Lo FS









Tokeeptheexamplesimple, weassumethatu(y,S)=y+S, Sa = βY a/χA(a),
ψ = 0,a n dM ={ } . Then the aggregate amount of criminal payoff is simply
given by ∫a∈AC βY a da,a n d
¯ S =( q∗)−1 ∫a∈AC
βY a da. (9)
U s i n gR e s u l t5 ,w eh a v et h a tSa = ¯ S for all a ∈ AC,a n dw ek n o wt h a tt h et h e
marginal criminal q∗ i sg i v e nb yt h eq which solves
(1− p)(Yq +q−1 ∫a∈AC
βY a da) = Yq. (10)




















Figure 2: The equilibrium crime density for α ∈{ 3/2,2,5/2,3} without private security
(β = 1/10, p = 1/2).
2.7 Discussion
The result that, loosely speaking, “all of the poor and none of the rich are
criminals”, is of course a result of the simplifications of the model and not




3While the utility U depends on income (thus type) of an individual, the utility function
u has the same form for each individual of every income type.
22individuals. In the simplest case, we could consider two sub-populations such
that all members of one sub-population consider crime as a possible option
withoutanymoralconcerns,whereasmembersoftheothersub-populationare
incorruptible and exclude crime from their considerations; these individuals
would be dummy players with a strategy space consisting only of the strategy
−1. A more sophisticated approach would consider an additional continuous
type-dimension, e.g. Z =[ 0,1] s u c ht h a tp a y o fff r o mc r i m ei sd i s c o u n t e d
according to z ∈ Z;s a y ,u(y,S)=y +zS. The (marginal) distribution on Z
could also depend on the income type. Another generalization would be to
consider a correlation between legal income opportunity and payoff from
crime; if skill and education determine legal income, these factors could also
affect illegal income.
Some of the assumptions made so far deserve at least a brief discussion.
Th ea s s u m p t i o n st h a tp a y o fff r o mc r i m ec a n n o tb es t o l e na g a i na n dt h a t
disutility from crime does not involve loss of income are obviously unrealistic.
R e m a r k1b r i e fl yg i v e sar e a so nf o rt h efi r s ta s s u m p t i o n .R e m a r k2e x p l a i n st h e
c o n c e p to fh a r mf r o mc r i m ea n dt h a tw et h i n ko fi n c o m eY as “net of theft”.
Note that payoff from crime will be equal for all individuals who decide to
become criminals. If, say, u(y,S)=v(y +S),w i t hv being a usual Bernoulli
utility function, then crime will somewhat raise and equalize total income
among lower income types. If that income could be stolen again, some crime
would shift from higher income types to the lower (criminal) income types. If
l o s so fi n c o m ed u et ot h e ftw o u l da l s od e c r e a s eu t i l i t yf r o mi n c o m e ,c r i m e
may either increase marginally (due to higher incentives via loss of income) or
decrease marginally (due to lower extra income from crime and the increased
harm that comes with increased income). Overall, the major results would
remain qualitatively unchanged.
Another assumptions which simplifies the model is that legal income is
supplemented by criminal income. And alternative and perhaps more usual
setup would have individuals decide how much of their time to devote to legal
work and crime, which would also add another dimension to the strategy
space. However, with the assumption that criminal payoff cannot be stolen,
23individuals could then prefer crime over legal work partly because it reduces
the harm suffered from crime (see also Remark 2). The current specification
avoids this problem. The model still produces the intuitive result that a higher
legal income reduces incentives to become criminal because of increasing
opportunity costs (i.e. legal income) and decreasing returns to crime.
3 private security
3.1 Preliminaries
After the basic model has been set up in Section 2, we will now introduce a
n e wt y p eo fp l a y e r ,ap r i v a t es e c u r i t yc o m p a n y(PSC). We let n ∈ N be the
total number of PSCs on the market and denote N ={ 1,...,n}. A PSC ℓ ∈ N
offers a certain amount of effort eℓ ∈ R+ a g a i n s tc r i m e ,w h i c hh et r i e st os e l l
a tap r i c eρℓ ∈ R+.F o rt h ep r o v i s i o no fa na m o u n teℓ of effort, the PSC incurs
costs, given by a continuous and strictly increasing variable cost function
kℓ ∶ R+ → R+ with kℓ(0)=0. We denote e =( e1,...,eℓ) the vector of efforts
provided by the PSCs. With ¯ n ≥ 1 PSCs, we denote eΣ = ∑ℓ∈N eℓ the aggregate
effort provided. We assume that the effort provided by the PSCs is perfectly
substitutable, i.e. there is no difference in quality of effort. PSCs engage in
C o u r n o tc o m p e t i t i o n ,t h u ss e l l i n ga tt h es a m em a r k e tc l e a r i n gp r i c eρℓ = ρ.
Thus, their characterizing profit function π ∶ R2
+ → R is given by
πℓ(eℓ,ρ)=eℓ ρ − kℓ(eℓ) (12)
Let Π ={ πℓ}n
ℓ=1 denote the set of profit functions of all PSCs.
Let X = R+ ∪{∞}.A neffort allocation is a Lebesgue measurable and
integrable function ξ ∶ Q → X that satisfies ∫q∈Q ξ(˜ q)d ˜ q ≤ eΣ.L e tΞ be the
set of all effort allocations.
Each individual in characterized by utility function V ∶ A×M × X ×Ξ →
R. Given the strategy aq ∈ A, the strategy distribution ν of all individuals,
and the effort allocation ξ, Vq(aq,ν,ξ(q),ξ) r e p r e s e n t st h eu t i l i t yo ft h a t
individual. Let V be the set of all utility functions. The economy is then
24characterized by (μ,Π),w h e r eμ is a (Borel) measure on V, i.e. a game of
crime.
3.2 The Utility Functions
As before, the payoff from stealing of individuals of income type q depends on
their income Yq and the crime density at q,b u tn o wi ta l s od e p e n d so nξ(q).
ThispayoffcanberepresentedbyacontinuousfunctionS ∶ Q×R+×X → R+.
We assume that the effort against crime purchased will not directly reduce
the disutility from criminal activity. It can, however, change the disutility
indirectly via a different crime density induced by ξ. We will model the effect
of ξ as a transformation of the income that can be stolen; more about this
Assumption 3’ below.
W ec a nn o ws p e c i f yt h eu t i l i t yf o re a c ht y p ea n de a c hs t r a t e g y .
Vq(a, χA,x,ξ)=
⎧ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪
⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
u(Yq − ρx,0)−H(χA[q]) if a =− 1,
(1− p)u(Yq − ρx,S[Ya, χA(a),ξ(a)])
−pψ−H(χA[q]) if a ∈ AC.
(13)
We assume that individuals cannot spend more than their income Yq on
effort against crime, but this is an economic restraint, not a technical one. We
adopt all of the assumptions specified in Section 2.2, which easily generalize
to the case considered here, except for Assumption 3, for which we adopt
Assumption 3’. Let T ∶ R+ ×R → R+ be a continuous measurable integrable
function.
Assumption 3’. It holds that S(Ya, χA[a],ξ[a]) = S(T[Ya,ξ(a)], χA[a]),
where T is strictly increasing in Ya and strictly decreasing in ξ(a) for all
a ∈ AM,w i t hT(y,0)=y, T(y,x)<y for x > 0 and T(y,x)>y for
x < 0. Furthermore, T is convex in ξ(a): ∂T(y,x)/∂y > 0, ∂T(y,x)/∂x < 0
and ∂2T(y,x)/∂x2 > 0,a n dlimx→∞ T(y,x)→Ym if ¯ M is not empty and
limx→∞ T(y,x)→Y0 otherwise. Furthermore, ∂2T(y,x)/(∂x∂y)>0.
25For all a ∈ AM and Ya > 0, Sa satisfies the following conditions: ∂Sa/∂Ta >
0,∂ 2Sa/∂T2
a ≥ 0,∂ S a/∂χA(s)<0,∂ 2Sa/∂χA(a)≥0 with limχA(a)→∞ Sa = 0.
Remark 7. The function T transforms the income distribution Y into a new
distribution, in a sense reducing the “stealable income”, and can be interpreted
a sap r o t e c t i o nt e c h n o l o g yw i t hd e c r e a s i n gm a r g i n a lr e t u r n s .
Assumption 3’ gives very general conditions for the transformation of
income. One particular form which satisfies the assumptions is given in
Condition 5.
Condition 5. The function T satisfies T(y,x)=b−txy,with b > 1 and t > 0.
3.3 Equilibrium
We can now define the equilibrium of the economy. Let τ be a Borel measure
on V × X.
Definition2. For an economy (μ,Π), a tuple (χ,ξ,ρ,e) is a competitive crime-
security-equilibrium if
(i) χ is an equilibrium crime distribution of the game of crime μ, i.e. χV = μ
and χ({(V,a)∶V(a, χA,ξ(a),ξ)≥V(a′, χA,ξ(a),ξ)∀a′ ∈ A}) =1 .
(ii) τ({(V,x)∶V(a, χA,x,ξ)≥V(a, χA,x′,ξ)∀x′ ∈ Xa n dρx ,ρx′ ≤ Y}) =
1.
(iii) ∫q∈I ξ(˜ q)d ˜ q = eΣ,
(iv) πℓ(eℓ,ρ)≥πℓ(e,ρ) for all e ∈ R+ and all ℓ ∈ N.
The effort allocation ξ is a symmetric equilibrium effort allocation if additionally
we have
τ({(Vq,ξ[q]) ∶ q ∈ Q}) = 1
i.e. individuals of the same income type choose the same effort.
Proposition 3. A competitive crime-security-equilibrium with a symmetric
equilibrium effort allocation exists.
26Proof We first establish the following easy lemma:
Lemma 3. For any given symmetric effort allocation ξ,t h e r ee x i s t sa ne q u i l i b -
rium crime distribution χξ.
P r o o fo fL e m m a3 Given the assumptions on T (Assumption 3’), any effort
allocation ˆ ξ transformsY, leadingtoanewdistributionrelevantforthechoice
of a. It can be easily seen that Proposition 1 holds as before.
The next lemma, while based on a result due to Rath et al. (1995), is also
q u i t es i m p l e( s e eR e m a r k8b e l o w ) .
Lemma 4. F o ra n yg i v e np r i c eρ > 0, there exists ξ such that every individual
o ft y p eqc h o o s e sξ (q) and
τ({(V,x)∶V(a, χA,x,ξ)≥V(a, χA,x′,ξ) for all x′ ∈ X
and ρ x,ρx′ ≤ Y}) = 1 (14)
τ({(Vq,ξ[q]) ∶ q ∈ Q}) = 1 (15)
Th a ti s ,t h e r ee x i s t sas y m m e t r i ce q u i l i b r i u me ff o r ta l l o c a t i o n .
P r o o fo fL e m m a4 The best reply correspondence B ∶ V → X is given by
B(V)={ x ∈ X ∶ V(a, χA,x,ξ)≥V(a, χA,x′,ξ)∀x′ ∈ X}.
N o t et h a tE q .( 1 4 )i se q u i v a l e n tt o
∂u(Yq − ρξ[q],Sa)/∂ξ(q)=∂H(χA[q])/∂ξ(q) (16a)
whenever ξ(q)>0a n dρξ(q)≤Yq,
∂u(Yq − ρξ[q],Sa)/∂ξ(q)≤∂H(χA[q])/∂ξ(q) (16b)
whenever ξ(q)>0a n dρξ(q)=Yq,
∂u(Yq − ρξ[q],Sa)/∂ξ(q)≥∂H(χA[q])/∂ξ(q) (16c)
whenever ξ(q)=0.
27I tc a nb ee a s i l ys e e nt h a tg i v e nρ and ξ,t h eb e s tr e p l yo fa n yi n d i v i d u a li sa
singleton. Thus, B is single-valued. Now, let
XB ={μ ○b−1 ∶ b i sam e a s u r a b l es e l e c t i o nf r o mB}.
Rath et al. (1995) show that if XB is closed, a symmetric equilibrium exists.
Because B is single-valued, we have that
{b ∶ b i sam e a s u r a b l es e l e c t i o nf r o mB}=B,
so XB is trivially closed.
Given the existence of an equilibrium crime distribution and an equilib-
rium effort allocation for given ρ, a demand or inverse demand function for
effort exists. Standard arguments then easily establish an equilibrium vector e.
Remark 8. Lemma 4 is a special case of Theorem 4 in Rath et al. (1995). The
existenceofanequilibriumallocationfollowsdirectlyfromexistencetheoremsfor
non-atomic games (Schmeidler 1973, Mas-Colell 1984, Rath 1992). However, for
compact but uncountably infinite strategy sets there may not exist a symmetric
equilibrium distribution, i.e. an equilibrium where all individuals of the same
t yp ec h o o s et h es a m es t r a t e gy .Th i sw a sn o tr e l e v a n tf o rP r o p o s i t i o n1 ,a sw ew e r e
only interested in the crime density at q w i t h o u tr e g a r dt ow h i c ho ft h ei n c o m e
types stole from q.N o wt h ed i s t r i b u t i o nm a t t e r s ,a st h ee ff e c to fa na m o u n to f
effort x can depend on the type who chooses this x.
Lemma 4 is not surprising at all. Ultimately (and informally) a multi-
valued best reply is a necessary condition for the non-existence of a symmetric
equilibrium. The conditions for an equilibrium in the case considered here imply
that the best reply is always single-valued, so the problem disappears completely.
I nf a c t ,w ek n o wf r o mt h el i t e r a t u r et h a ta ne q u i l i b r i u me ff o r ta l l o c a t i o ne x i s t s ,
and the conditions for such an equilibrium derived from this model imply that
if an equilibrium exists, it has to be symmetric.
28Result 8. In any competitive crime-security-equilibrium, for q ∈ ¯ M, ξ(q)=0.
For any given eΣ and all q,q′ ∈ M, ξ(q)≤ξ(q′) whenever Yq < Yq′ and
ξ(q′)≥0.






















for all ˆ x ∈ X and Yq < Yq′.
(18)
Eq. (17) is obvious and follows from Assumption 7. Eq. (18) follows from
∂2T(y,x)/∂x2 > 0 and ∂2Sa/∂T2
a ≥ 0 (by Assumption 3’) and Result 2 which
states that χA(a)<χA(a′) if Ya < Ya′, which can be transferred to the
framework here, i.e. χA(a)<χA(a′) if Ta < Ta′.
R e s u l t8s t a t e st h a ti n c o m et y p e sw h i c hd on o ta t t r a c ta n yc r i m ea ta l l
(q ∈ M) will not demand any effort against crime in equilbrium. Furthermore,
demand for effort weakly increases in income.
3.4 Further Results
Giventhebasicmodelinthep r evioussection,weno wturntotheim plica tions
for the distribution of crime with private security.
Result 9. It is possible that “intermediate” income types suffer from a higher
crime density than “rich” individuals: Suppose demand for effort against crime
is positive for a set of individuals of measure greater than zero, and Conditions
1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 hold with γ = 0,a n dt h a tM=∅ .Th e n
291. if utility from income is linear, either
•ξ (q)>0 and χA(q)=χA(q′) for all q,q′ ∈ Q,or
• there exists q0 ∈ Q such that ξ(q)=0 for all q ∈[ 0,q0], ξ(q)>0
for all q ∈( q0,q],a n dχA(q)=χA(q′)<χA(q0)=χA(q′′)
whenever Yq < Yq′ for q,q′ ∈[ 0,q0) and q′′ ∈( q0,1];
2. if utility from income is strictly concave, either
•ξ (q)>0 for all q ∈ Qa n dχ A(q)>χA(q′) whenever Yq < Yq′,o r
• there exists q0 ∈ Q such that ξ(q)=0 for all q ∈[ 0,q0], ξ(q)>0
for all q ∈( q0,q],a n dχA(q)<χA(q′) whenever Yq < Yq′ for
q,q′ ∈[ 0,q0],a n dχA(q)>χA(q′) whenever Yq < Yq′ for q,q′ ∈
[q0,1].
Proof The proof is based on the following lemma:





∂x′ ⇔ T(y,x)=T(y′,x′). (19)













⇔ H(χ[q]) = H(χ[q′]). (21)
Proof of Lemma 5 With T(y,x)=b−txy (Condition 5), we obtain
∂T(y,x)/∂x =−log(b)b−txy.Th e n∂T(y,x)/∂x = ∂T(y′,x′)/∂x′ is equiv-
alent to b−txy = b−tx ′
y′, and Eq. 19 follows. With S(T[Yq,ξ(q)], χA[q]) =
βT[Yq,ξ(q)]/χA(q) (Conditions 1 and 2) and Sq = Sq′ (Result 1) it follows
that χA(q)=χA(q′) i fa n do n l yi fT(Yq,ξ[q]) = T(Yq′,ξ[q′]). Then with Eq.
19, Eq. 20 follows. Finally, Eq. 21 is obvious.
301. We have ∂u(Yq−ρx)/∂x =− ρ. Thusinequilibrium−∂H(χA[q])/∂x =
ρ for all q ∈ Q such that ξ(q)>0 (i.e. all q ∈[ q0,1]).W i t hL e m m a5i t
follows that χ(q)=χ(q′).
2. In equilibrium −∂H(χA[q])/∂x = ∂u(Yq − ρx,Sa)/∂x; ∂u(Yq −
ρx,Sa)/∂x is decreasing in Yq, implying χA(q)<χA(q′) whenever
Yq < Yq′ for all q,q′ ∈[ q0,1].
Remark9. Result9alsoholdsforsomewhatlessrestrictiveassumptions. Whatis
particularly interesting about the result is that with linear utility, private security
equalizesharm(andthus,crime)amongthosewhopurchaseanypositiveamount
o fe ff o r ta g a i n s tc r i m e ,a n dt h a tw i t hd e c r e a s i n gm a r g i n a lu t i l i t y ,t h ec r i m e
density actually decreases in income for the income range in which individuals
p u r c h a s eap o s i t i v ea m o u n to fe ff o r t .
Result 10. Security is a superior good, i.e. the proportion of income spent on
securityincreaseswithincome. Thedemandforsecurityobeysthelawofdemand,
i.e. demand decreases in ρ. Supply increases in ρ.
We omit the proof of Result 10, as it is obvious.
Result 11. Individuals with zero demand for effort never benefit from private
security. If ξ(q)=0 and Sq > 0,t h e yw i l ls u ff e rf r o mah i g h e rc r i m ed e n s i t y
than without private security.
Proof Th i si sav a r i a n to fR e s u l t7 .
Result 12. An increase in the income of individuals in some non-empty interval
[q3,1]⊂Q can increase the crime density suffered by individuals in some non
empty interval [q1,q2]⊂[ 0,q3),w i t hq 2 < q3.
Proof Consider Figure 3. The first part shows the old and new income distri-
bution with three distinct income types (solid lines), which we will refer to as
“the poor”, “the middle class’, and “the rich”. The income of the poor is below
31the threshold Ym, i.e. they will not experience harm from crime. Income
is then shifted from the poor to the rich, preserving the mean income. Let
Yq,2 = Yq,1 +δ be the new income of rich types q.S u p p o s et h a tt h em a r g i n a l
u t i l i t yf r o mi n c o m ef o rt h er i c hi sa l r e a d yv e ryl o w .Th ei n c r e a s ei ni n c o m e
will then lead to an increase in expenditure on effort against crime very close
to δ, because (i) the marginal reduction in harm from crime will increase and
(ii) the marginal utility from income will decrease (see Figure 3, lower right).
This increase in demand will lead to an increase in the price for security (by
Result 10), which can lead the middle class to demand less security (see Figure
3, lower left).
We summarize the main results of this section in the following (informal)
proposition:
Proposition 4. There exists a competitive crime-security-equilibrium; in any
such equilibrium, the equilibrium effort allocation is symmetric. Demand for
e ff o r ta g a i n s tc r i m ei n c r e a s e si ni n c o m e ,e ff o r ta g a i n s tc r i m ei sas u p e r i o rg o o d ,
and it obeys the law of demand. If marginal utility of income is constant, pri-
vate security equalizes the crime density among those who demand security in
equilibrium. If marginal utility of income is decreasing, crime density increases
with income up to the marginal income type who demand zero effort, and then
decreases in income. Those who do not demand security in equilibrium will not
benefit from the effort against crime demanded by others, and will often suffer
from a higher crime density. Increasing inequality can shift crime away from
those with increased income to those whose income remains constant.
3.5 An Example


































Figure 3: A higher inequality can lead to less crime but a higher crime density for the middle
class.
33stealable income which satisfies Condition 5: T(y,x)=exp(−x/2) y. Then,
¯ S =( q∗)−1 ∫a∈AC
βT(Ya,ξ[a])da
=( q∗)−1 ∫a∈AC
β exp(−ξ[a]/2)Ya da. (22)
U singResult9,wekno wtha tT(Ya,ξ[a])m ustbethesameforallpla yerswith
positive demand for effort against crime. Let us denote the strategy set which
consists of player types with positive demand as (a0,1]. For all a ∈( a0,1],w e
must have in equilibrium
S0 = β exp(−˜ ξ[a]/2)Ya da (23)
for some S0 > 0,w h e r e˜ ξ(a) may be negative. Solving Eq. (23) for ˜ ξ(a) gives




Setting ˜ ξ(a)=0 a n ds o l v i n gf o ra gives a0, depending on S0. In equilibrium,
the aggregate effort allocated to the players (i.e., total demand) must equal
total supply of effort:
∫a∈(a0,1]
˜ ξ(a)da = eΣ. (25)
Solving Eq (25) for S0 gives the explicit solution
S0 = β [exp(αe Σ/2)−1]
− 1
a (26)








34Figure 4 shows the equilibrium effort allocation for different parameters of

















Figure 4: The equilibrium effort allocation for α ∈{ 3/2,2,5/2,3}, β = 1/10, p = 1/2,a n d
eΣ = 1.
The marginal criminal q∗ is indifferent between choosing crime and no
crime; thus, q∗ is the q which solves
(1− p)(Yq +q−1 ∫a∈AC
β exp(−˜ ξ[a]/2)Ya da) = Yq. (28)
With
∫a∈AC




















we can then find, for rational values of α, explicit (though very lengthy)
solutions for the equilibrium crime level, the equilibrium crime distribution,
35a n dt h em a r k e tp r i c ef o ra n yg i v e ns u p p l yo fe ff o r teΣ (i.e. the inverse demand
function).
Figures 5 and 6 show the equilibrium crime distribution for α = 2 and
α = 3, respectively, and two different values of eΣ. The figures also show
the sum of the harm suffered due to crime density and the expenditure for
effort against crime (i.e. the market price ρ time the effort demanded). In
this particular example, we can simply add up these two components of the
utilityfunctionbecausebothutilityfromincomeandharmfromcrimedensity
are identity functions. Figure 7 shows the market price or inverse demand
function for effort against crime for α = 2a n dα = 3.
χA(q)∣eΣ=0
χA(q)∣eΣ=1
χA(q)∣eΣ=1 + ρξ (q)
χA(q)
χA(q)+ρξ (q)








(a) eΣ = 1
χA(q)∣eΣ=0
χA(q)∣eΣ=2
χA(q)∣eΣ=2 + ρξ (q)
q








(b) eΣ = 2
Figure 5: The equilibrium crime density with and without private security, and the sum of
harm and expenditure on effort against crime for α = 2, β = 1/10, and p = 1/2.
Consider for example Figure 5.(a). It shows that compared to a situation
without private security, the poorest 53% of players will suffer from a higher
crime density once private security is introduced. Perhaps even more inter-
estingly, only the richest 17% actually benefit from private security: Players
of type q ∈[ .53,.83] do enjoy a lower crime density, but the expenses for
private security more than compensate the positive effect. Players of a type
36χA(q)∣eΣ=0
χA(q)∣eΣ=1
χA(q)∣eΣ=1 + ρξ (q)
χA(q)
χA(q)+ρξ (q)






(a) eΣ = 1
χA(q)∣eΣ=0
χA(q)∣eΣ=1
χA(q)∣eΣ=1 + ρξ (q)
q






(b) eΣ = 2
Figure 6: The equilibrium crime density with and without private security, and the sum of
harm and expenditure on effort against crime for α = 3, β = 1/10, and p = 1/2.
q ∈[ .37,.53] do not only suffer from a higher crime density than without
private security, they even have positive expenditure on private security.
Comparing Figure 5.(a) with 5.(b), we see that an increase in supply of
effort against crime will reduce the measure of players who are worse off
due to private security; however, those who still do not benefit from private
securityareevenworseoff. ComparingFigures5and6showsthatasinequality
decreases (in the sense of the Lorenz ordering), both negative and positive
effects of private security are still present but less pronounced.
3.6 Discussion
The competition among PSCs could also, and perhaps more realistically, be
modelled as Bertrand-competition with capacity choice, which also leads to
Cournot-outcomes (Kreps and Scheinkman 1983).
We have not explicitly modelled emigration. Barenboim and Campante
(2008)findthatincreasingcrimelevelscanleadtotheemigrationofthemiddle
class, leaving behind only the very poor and the very rich, thus increasing
inequality; the rich stay because they can afford privately supplied security.
Result 12 suggests that an extension of our model can generate this result











Figure 7: The equilibrium market price for effort (i.e. the inverse demand function), for
α ∈{ 2,3}, β = 1/10, and p = 1/2.
density at intermediate income types, leaving them worse off. If this effect is
strong enough, higher inequality can push utility of the middle class below a
threshold level which triggers emigration. News reports and research4 suggest
that this is indeed an effect of the high crime rates in South Africa, leading
skilled middle member of the middle class to leave the country.
4 discussion
4.1 Possible Extensions
Besides explicitly modelling of emigration (see Section 3.6), another interest-
ing extension which would introduce dynamics to game would be to consider
social mobility. If social mobility is generally high, i.e. the poor can expect to
have higher legal incomes in the near future, this might substantially reduce
crime, as the expected opportunity costs would increase.
A further generalization of the model would consider individuals being
endowedwithatimebudgetwhichtheycanspendonnormalwork(generating
4See, for instance, BBC News World Edition, July 24th, 2002: “South Africa Hit by ‘Brain-
Drain”’, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2149297.stm; The New York Times, November 1st,
2008: “South African Emigration Leads to Skills Shortage”; Dodson (2002); Bohlman (2010).
38the legal income of the model considered here), crime (generating the payoff
from crime), and effort against crime which can be sold on the market for
am a r k e tp r i c eρ. In that case, the increase in the market price caused by
increased demand would also reduce crime by increasing opportunity costs:
Both security services and crime is “provided” by low income types; higher
income from security work would decrease crime.
The increase in the market price for private security can also affect the
expenditure and recruitment of the state police. Goodenough (2007) reports
that the private security officers in South Africa are often paid more than the
regular police. Thus, a higher demand for private security can also lead to a
lower level of publicly provided security.
4.2 Conclusion
We modelled crime as non-atomic game with decreasing returns to crime
as more criminals exploit stealable income. The specification of the model
allowed to derive a crime distribution, i.e. a distribution of criminal activity
among individuals of different incomes. We showed that there exists an equi-
librium crime distribution which equalizes payoff of stealing from any income
type for which stealing is profitable at all. There exists a marginal criminal:
All individuals with lower income supplement their income with crime, while
all individuals with higher income do not commit crimes. Inequality tends to
increase crime by (i) lowering the income of poorer individuals and/or (ii)
increasing “stealable income”; however, for (i) it matters whether the income
ofthemarginalcriminalisamongtheincomeswhichdecrease; itispossibleto
find examples for which higher inequality actually leads to less crime. Higher
income of high income types can decrease the harm from crime suffered
by poor and intermediate income types: Even though crime increases, the
crime targeted at high income types increases by more than overall crime,
t h u ss h i ft i n gs o m eo ft h ec r i m ef r o mp o o ra n di n t e r m e d i a t et y p e st ot h er i c h .
Introducing private security can substantially change some of the results
o ft h em o d e lw i t h o u tp r i v a t ep r e c a u t i o n sa g a i n s tc r i m e .W es h o w e dt h a tt h e r e
exists a competitive crime-security-equilibrium; in any such equilibrium, the
39equilibrium effort allocation is symmetric. Demand for effort against crime
increasesinincome,effortagainstcrimeisasuperiorgood,anditobeysthelaw
ofdemand. Ifmarginalutilityofincomeislinear,privatesecurityequalizesthe
crime density among those who demand security in equilibrium. If marginal
utility of income is decreasing, crime density increases with income up to the
marginal income type who demand zero effort, and then decreases in income.
Those who do not demand security in equilibrium will not benefit from the
effort against crime demanded by others, and will often suffer from a higher
crime density. Increasing inequality can shift crime away from those with
increased income to those whose income remains constant.
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